Reply to Ed

Here is my response to the evolutionist Ed Darrell, as a continuation of this comment thread. It may take awhile to complete this post because of the sheer quantity of material, but Ed is a very earnest and sincere guy, so I want to give him his due.

First off, I don’t see a logical connection between knowing philosophy of science and knowing biology. I am told that most scientists (like most people everywhere) don’t really care about philosophy. That is because they are mostly concerned with solving the puzzles presented by the dominant paradigm within their own narrow discipline. Likewise, I don’t have a philosophical axe to grind, because I don’t teach philosophy, I just do the grunt work to get philosophy books published.

1. Entelechy is definitely still a popular idea with Christians. My point was that Kuhn does not identify Darwin’s opposition as mainly consisting of “crackpots and a popular, though wrong, competition from faith.” There is no doubt that Kuhn loves science and regards Darwinian evolutionary theory as the model for scientific paradigm change. However, as a paradigm itself, it is still subject to Kuhn’s method of analysis. I don’t see anywhere that Kuhn evaluates scientific theories as “good” or “bad”; his methodology is applied without partiality, based on his understanding of the sociology of scientific inquiry.

I don’t think I explained entelechy very well, because your remark about school boards has absolutely nothing to do with it. Let me know if you need a detailed reference for entelechy. Perhaps I muddied the waters by making an analogy between the entelechy of organisms, which is a well-established naturalistic fact, and the entelechy of humanity as a whole. I jumped ahead of myself because I was thinking about Enlightenment rationalism and melioristic belief systems, and how common it was in the 19th century to see evolution as progress, an idea which has since been thoroughly discredited.

2. Yes, my sarcastic little item about “evolution groupies” was indulgent. Evolution groupies are those people who don’t do evolution theory, they just hang around the experts, gawking and cheering and hanging on every word. Even someone as ignorant as I am can identify these idiots; since they can’t actually think for themselves, they often contradict the less glamorous experts. Because their highest goal in life is political influence, they have to jump on the bandwagon for dear life.

One example is the amateur evolution advocates who still believe that evolution is progress. PZ Myers, Thomas Kuhn, Charles Sullivan, and many others have tried to stamp this out, without success.

To be perfectly fair, there are also creation science groupies. And, frankly, I put them in the same category with the evolution groupies.

3. You’re right, Ed, to state that all those processes have been observed. Actually, they had been observed in different ways for thousands of years; and, moreover, humans have taken advantage of that kind of knowledge for thousands of years in developing useful technology. Were they practicing science? Were they evolutionary biologists?

PZ Myers held a discussion about the meaning of science, and it was interesting how flexible the definitions became, in order to include every activity of mankind that involves direct observation of the natural world and leads to practical results. The problem is, whereas that describes a natural scientific tendency in humans, it is not science. You would never accept the results from such a methodology as real science today.

Also, can you call it evolutionary biology if some uneducated, superstitious farmer were able to deduce such principles through observation, or simply by applying traditional knowledge?

The product of science, as distinct from practical reason, is the inference of universal principles from recorded observations, generalizing in order to come up with a new hypothesis that contains some untested element. The product of evolutionary biology, as distinct from Mendelian genetics, is universal principles that tie together all the different strands of life over billions of years and across millions of local ecosystems.

Neither of those conceptual activities was necessary to develop the technologies of forestry, farming, animal husbandry, or wildlife management. Both are modern abstractions intended to explain after the fact why such technologies work.

Nevertheless, scientists can use their hypotheses to stimulate useful inquiry. Kuhn shows how scientific inquiry progresses for long periods of time, despite the fact that the prevailing assumptions may be later proven false.

I don’t really care about the public image or political standing of your enemies, Ed; I am not a teacher or a politician. My livelihood depends on actual facts, sitting in front of me, not simulations and not what someone “says” is real. Show me how something works in real life, right now; don’t rationalize about how it may have worked a million years ago or is supposed to work, if only we could observe every independent variable for 150,000 years. Just because you can rationalize it doesn’t make it true, or useful. And there is simply no reason for me to accept, or even care about, the idealistic generalizations of evolutionary theory.

4. Patterson, p. 147:

Modern evolutionary theory does not say that all evolutionary change is caused by natural selection: random effects, like genetic drift, have played a part. Natural selection is therefore protected from falsification by the alternative explanation, random effects.

I wrote that Patterson says that evolution allows for random mutation, meaning that the theory accepts it as consistent with natural selection. In the scientific sense, “random” does not mean “uncaused,” as you seem to imply that I think; it means that it cannot be predicted by the hypothesis, because one or more independent variables is not controlled for (”unexpected,” as you write). I would not use the term “undirected” in this context, because it is meaningless; the hypothesis of natural selection requires that the process is always undirected.

I think you have confused “falsifiable” with “false.” Therefore, I will try to avoid using that word in my explanation. (The meaning of “falsifiable” is precisely what I have been discussing with rawdc, so you should look at his comments to “The Honest Evolutionist.” It seems like I have been hashing it out with him forever, but maybe it’s just because he’s a math dude, and their proofs never seem to end.)
No one is claiming randomness does not occur; the problem is that if your hypothesis allows an unaccounted-for independent variable to serve as explanation, then it will never be disproven by evidence, because any evidence contradicting the rest of the hypothesis can always be attributed to the unaccounted-for independent variable.

This is usually given as the primary argument by scientific atheists against creationism: “If you claim that God is not constrained by natural laws, then your hypothesis includes a random effect, therefore it is unfalsifiable and unscientific.” If it is good enough to use against creationism, why not against evolutionism?

Perhaps I am being too picky about the meaning of an example of “intelligent design.” It is trivial to find examples of design in nature, in the sense of order. However, attributing it to intelligence requires identifying the designer, and the “Intelligent Design” paradigm really doesn’t account for that; it is stupid to expect proof of intelligence after the fact in an ordered system, if you can’t specify the meaning of it. That was a crack at ID, not evolution, in case you missed it.

You may call it “dogmatic” to demand actual evidence, but in the real world such dogma is useful. It’s called “honesty” in many circles. It’s telling that creationists complain that requiring honesty is unfair.

Did I say that? No. I don’t know why you attribute that to me. However, since we are on the subject of honesty, I refer you to my comments at Bob Dudesky:

Which do you value more: The results from a scientist who conducts a real-time, controlled experiment, using solid methodology and a good population sample, recording all the data using well-calibrated instruments; or the results from a scientist who does all the same things after the fact, looking only at forensic evidence.

I didn’t say that forensic evidence has no value; clearly, inferences are necessary in many parts of life. My claim is that forensic evidence in science is always inferior to actual observation. And rather than answer my question, you and the other commenters went on to make arguments about why forensic evidence is trustworthy. How pathetic and cowardly.

What is the problem with just admitting that you are making a highly probable inference? Then we could move on. But no; you have to make the claim that observing the forensic evidence of hominid evolution is of equal value with observing the actual process of hominid evolution. Really, it isn’t; so why not just say it is impossible to observe the actual process of hominid evolution, as laelaps accidentally did? What are you afraid of?

On the question of genetic engineering, it is indisputable that it happens. And I really have no doubt that environmental factors can be more favorable to the survival and reproduction of some individuals rather than others. I guess that means I’m an evolutionist. Hurray, you converted me! But wait . . . what about all those other conclusions, such as unobserved past events? Can you allow someone to disbelieve part of the system, or do they have to swallow it whole?

5. I’m talking about all the steps between the prehumans and modern humans. For example, the ability of an animal to acquire symbolic language. You aren’t one of those dolphin/whale/bonobo equality advocates, are you? Give me a break.

6. Kuhn’s point is that “normal science” solves puzzles within its paradigm. It doesn’t ask whether the paradigm is correct. Eventually, the paradigm changes. Let me be clear: Whatever the current paradigm is, eventually it will be proven wrong.

Here, we come back to the question of falsifiability and honesty. I am willing to admit that I have certain prior assumptions and prejudices. For example, I really don’t care about any claim made by anyone, whether evolutionist, Christian, creationist, or lawyer, for which they cannot demonstrate it physically or demonstrate why I should assume it to be true. In your case, I understand why I should assume that genetic engineering is true; I don’t understand why I should assume that humans are descended from animals, because it doesn’t matter. Rather than attempt to demonstrate it, you keep pounding on the rationality of your inferences. On the other hand, evolutionists cling to a phony objectivity and pretend that they have no prior assumptions or prejudices.

7. I think I have already made clear that I am not a scientist. However, I know two molecular geneticists; both work on modifying grains. Their work relies on actual experiments in the present, and makes no reference to what the ancestor of corn was a million years ago or what its environment may have been like. It just doesn’t have anything to do with real science.

I don’t know anything about diabetes research. Wasn’t compatibility determined by taking actual samples from live subjects and testing them, rather than assuming that only our “closest relatives” are the best sources?

Conclusion

In conclusion, Ed, I think you have made a powerful case for the importance of genetic science, but your overreliance on it looks like an evasion of the broader questions, such as whether it matters that everyone accept the proposition that humans are descended from animals. Even if it were useful for making scientific hypotheses, why should anyone else care?

I think you need to re-read Kuhn, Patterson, and Popper, because you made a lot of unqualified assumptions about what they wrote.

I think you have helped me clarify my own assumptions and prejudices, such as the fact that I really despise people who are motivated primarily by politics, so I get sarcastic about them. Also, I don’t have much confidence in ID and I am more pragmatic than I might like to admit. I wish you would drop the pretense that you have no prior assumptions.

Thanks for your patience.

6 Responses to “Reply to Ed”

  1. Ed Darrell Says:

    The only connection between philosophy of science and doing biology is in the skewed view of critics of evolution theory who, without much evidence, assert that scientists are a priori biased against contradicting views or data, and philosophically disposed to protect at all costs science against any form of religion. That’s a dubious claim at best, and one I find to be completely false. Scientists are concerned with accuracy, so that their findings can stand scrutiny, and especially so that their findings will be useful to others. Critics of evolution theory and biology and biologists tend to dismiss completely that biologists are human, and do their work for altruistic reasons (including that it’s a lot of fun).

    So if we can dismiss philosophy, that’s fine by me. I’m happy in such discussions to stick with the philosophical statement of Joseph Pulitzer, who one yelled in his newsroom, “Accuracy! Accuracy! Accuracy!” That’s closer to the real, applied philosophy of biologists. Alas, it’s far from the philosophy of creationists and other critics of evolution theory.

    No, Kuhn doesn’t call Darwin’s critics crackpots. I do. Most of them are.

    Kuhn used evolution as a model for how paradigms shift. He suggested that the opposition dies out, and the new paradigm gets accepted. Darwinian evolution was the example he used (though I can’t find the page at the moment). Kuhn didn’t anticipate that people would defend error as religion, and thereby perpetuate opposition to proven concepts.

    In looking through Kuhn’s book, however, I see that he deals with “entelechy,” but without confusing it with archaic terms of philosophy. Kuhn notes that evolution was non-controversial for the hundred years prior to Darwin’s “big book,” but because Darwin’s mechanism removed any factor that might imply natural direction of evolution, he ran into trouble (see pp.171-172). This is almost amusing: In Darwinian evolution, any direction for evolution must be supernatural and practically undetectable. Critics today claim Darwin removed God from the process. Quite the contrary, Darwin’s discoveries simply removed God from common, everyday procedures and removed common concepts of magic. The only place left for God is in the supernatural; creationists don’t want God there, I guess.

    So the opposition to Darwin implies those who oppose him (and I’m assuming all do so on religious grounds — pragmatically, that’s a safe assumption) want a smaller god they can have control over, at least so far as confirming their own biases.

    Christian belief contains the mystery and miracle that, despite the fact that humans are utterly common and beneath a deity’s concern, God is indeed concerned about each of us. Creationism is based on the assumption that God darn well better be concerned about us since we are the crown of creation. Creationism is not Christian, it seems to me.

    Christianity is also concerned with accuracy. It’s impossible to maintain an argument against Darwinian evolution for more than about ten minutes without telling a whopper about science, or about the facts discovered by science, or about faith. Creationism depends on ignorance, which is why creationists keep demanding we dumb down science curricula and leave out completely vast portions of biology.

    I don’t know how that figures in, philosophically. Attempting to push it into a philosophical paradigm is a way of avoiding dealing with the facts, in my view.

    In fewer words, then, I think we agree broadly on the first point.

  2. Dave Says:

    I don’t think scientists are necessarily biased, but their miseducated supporters often are. Stevie Wonder says, “When you believe in things that you don’t understand, you will suffer; superstition ain’t the way.” Believing that a scientist can or should tell you how to live or what to think is a gross error.

    I’m happy to dismiss philosophy, since I’m not committed to any system and I am no system-builder. However, I am predisposed to philosophize.

    Kuhn doesn’t deal with society at large, but only the scientific subculture, so your example of “defending error as religion” doesn’t relate to his analysis.

    Kuhn uses the term “teleological,” which is less precise. Anything goal-directed is teleological, and implies intelligence. Entelechy, however, can be naturalistic, in that it refers to the essence of what something becomes being present at its inception. This, of course, can also describe genetic traits. Where Darwinism upsets the old Aristotelian notions is by suggesting that essential traits change with each generation in a way that does not lead to any kind of natural perfection, but simply as a response to environmental constraints. That contradicts beliefs in meliorism (progressive improvement), which anticipate a state of perfection toward which the type of organism (the race or species, if you will; or even the state) is progressing, regardless of its environment.

    Opposition to Darwin, as Kuhn illustrates, need not proceed on religious grounds. Patterson gives the example of Agassiz, for example. In the twentieth century, Darwinism has also been opposed by certain humanists, linguists, and semioticians, whose paradigm simply cannot account for nonhuman origins of peculiarly human traits. Also, traditional skepticism calls foul on anything systematic or intangible; but that way can lead to madness. Notably, religious historian Vine Deloria, writing from the point of view of Native American tradition (he hates the term “religion”), opposes Darwinism because it is too wedded to a Eurocentric Christian worldview!

    There is no difference between a small god and an idol, that’s for sure. But it also constrains God to say that everything in nature occurs mechanistically, contrary to the postulates of modern physics. In that respect, biology is still trying to catch up with Newtonian physics, as Patterson points out.

    Am I pushing a philosophical paradigm? Patterns are everywhere, and refusing to recognize them is deliberate ignorance. However, labeling them can be misleading.

  3. Ed Darrell Says:

    Stevie Wonder says, “When you believe in things that you don’t understand, you will suffer; superstition ain’t the way.”

    See? We agree: Science, based on hard fact, isn’t superstition. Creationism, including intelligent design, is superstition.

    I agree superstition ain’t the way. Science ain’t superstition.

  4. Dave Says:

    Here is the proposition: If an individual believes in something they do not understand, whether it be evolution, God, or intelligent design, they have a superstitious belief.

    Believing in something merely because of its intrinsic qualities is not sufficient to keep one’s belief from being superstitious. So, here I am quite comfortable in saying that many people have a superstitious belief in God, because their understanding is superficial.

    It works the same way with science. Science has no intrinsic quality making superficial belief valid.

  5. Ed Darrell Says:

    No. But science does have an intrinsic quality that makes valid facts clear. There’s a difference between belief and fact that religion and especially odd sects like the intelligent designists do not do well in distinguishing.

    Science can separate what is real from what is falsely believed to be real. That’s not superstition, but is instead the classic form of iconoclasm. If one believes something one does not understand, and it is false, then it is distinguished from those who trust and put their faith in others who better understand that science is not superstition. Most people don’t really understand the internal combustion engine, either, and leave the maintenance of their autos up to a trained mechanic. You would call that superstition, and you would suggest that such beliefs are no better than those who believe in magic flying carpets. I think there is a qualitative difference that should be recognized.

  6. Dave Says:

    It is not a quality intrinsic to science. It is a quality intrinsic to human experience, in which we test for ourselves theories that have personal consequences and simply trust in theories that don’t.

    I would also differentiate the trained mechanic from the automotive engineer and the theoretical physicist.

    I would say that it is superstitious to believe that an automotive mechanic knows everything about how any particular combustion engine works, because none of them do. Moreover, all of them together do not know everything about how any particular engine works, nor can any text explain it precisely. However, many people hold the superstition that a mechanic merely needs to “look at it” and can confidently give an accurate diagnosis. Even if they don’t believe that, they probably believe that if they spend $79 for a computer test, the diagnosis will be correct.

    A mechanical engineer knows even less about how any particular engine works, but more about how engines are supposed to work. Automotive executives hope that engineers can account for all possible problems with a design, and so marketers promote the superstition that engineers have designed car engines that will always perform according to the ideal desires of consumers. However, until a large number are road-tested, the engineer does not really know the probabilities of what will happen in aggregate; and he cannot predict what will happen in any specific case.

    A theoretical physicist, however, knows even less than an engineer about any particular internal combustion engine, especially if he rigorously disregards any experimental data that are anomalous or which insufficiently control independent variables. Fluid dynamics and thermodynamics, in particular, make a lot of assumptions because it is simply impossible to narrow down the independent variables enough to create a highly accurate model. However, most people superstitiously believe that a physicist can accurately describe every process occurring in an engine. Even if he could, that doesn’t mean I would trust him to fix it if all he has is theoretical knowledge of generic processes.

    The qualitative difference here depends on what you don’t know, as you imply with the bald statement, “it is false.” The car is real and it really works. The technology is real. The scientific principles that underlie the technology really yield results often enough to justify using them in engineering. Nevertheless, faith in any particular car-related science is a superstition if it is based on the principle that “since cars are real, I can trust anything related to them that sounds scientific.” This doesn’t invalidate the science; it invalidates the faith of the ignorant.

    Furthermore, if a theoretical physicist familiar only with current car models found a miscellaneous pile of old car parts, it would be superstitious to believe that he could accurately reconstruct all the cars that the old parts are from and describe in detail how they worked, how they were constructed, and the reasons for similarities to the current models. This is the problem with the historical sciences.

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